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This submission is made up of two short essays linked by a chain of 
thinking that becomes evident as their stories unfold. The first reflects 
contemporary events against an interpretation of history Michel Foucault 
started to develop in the last few years of his life. That view is itself 
reflected against events of the not-too-distant past in the context of 
strategic leadership of a global enterprise with deep UK roots.  
The second is a reflection on those reflections. It ponders what the first and 
second drafts of history have to say about the nature of news and social 
science research, and how we tell such stories.  
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Trump, Foucault and pre-modern governance 
 
 “No one ever accused this company of being a democracy!” – Private 
comment of a CEO of a major multinational corporation, overheard ca. 
1990 
This quote came to mind as I read the news about one of Donald J. Trump’s executive 
orders, signed in Week 1 of his Presidency of the United States. On the first full day in the 
office, the CEO-in-the-White-House invited a group of CEOs of major US corporations to 
discuss the future governance of America. CEOs have been practising corporate governance 
forever, and must know a thing or two about it. By the end of the meeting, surely they knew 
a lot more, because they were there to learn from each other, and from Trump.  
The Economist magazine, in its extended “Briefing” item the following week, said 
Trump’s advisers believe that he has “a mandate to blow up norms of good governance” 
(The Economist, 2017). Let us explore, then, what governance means.  
Trump’s ban on arrivals of citizens of seven, mainly Muslim states was one of those 
executive orders, though it was quickly, if temporarily, set aside by the courts. Petulantly, 
like a CEO annoyed by an underling, Trump ranted (a more accurate description than the 
sweet-sounding “tweeted”) against the judges who dared to defy him. Was he not the Leader 
of the Free World, as the “lying press” he despised kept telling us he was? Was he not 
President of the first democracy of the modern era, carrying out the will of the people?  
This vignette brings to mind another line of thought about governance. In the late 1970s, 
the French sociologist Michel Foucault delivered a series of lectures at the Collège de 
France, on security, territory and population (Foucault, 2009). In one of them he reflected on 
the term “governmentality”, a neologism without clear definition.  
Foucault’s puzzle was this: What led the people of Europe, with their broad acceptance 
during the Renaissance of the divine right of kings, to embrace an entirely different form of 
governance? The new one was based on the power of central administration and guided, at 
least in part, by dispassionate and rational processes, and not the whims of a monarch. He 
talked of the sense of order implicit in Machiavelli’s Prince, where what the choice is right 
leads to actions that can sustain popular faith in the ruler’s absolute authority, even without 
agreement in the rightness of the decision. But other decisions might destroy that faith.  
In the later period, faith transferred to the state, the apparatus of bureaucracy, and 
emerging “technologies” of governance. The word “governmentality” sounded at once like a 
mentality of governance and the ability to reconceive government.  
What happened between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment was, of course, the 
Thirty-Years’ War. It lasted most of the first half of the 17th Century. An estimated eight 
million people died, among them nearly a third of the population of the German states and 
principalities. Protestants and Catholics slaughtered each other over articles of faith, which 
had disguised the territorial ambitions of kings and princes.  
Its horror failed to destroy faith in God – we would have to wait until after the Second 
World War for that to spread through Europe. But it sapped support for monarchies. Their 
 2  
popular legitimacy waned, unleashing a fervent desire for an age of reason, which Toulmin 
(1992) describes and then challenges so well. It also set the stage for the unenlightened, 
unreasoning of the French Revolution. Democratic at first, French revolutionists soon 
reverted to pre-modern barbarism, halted only when Napoleon Bonaparte declared himself 
Emperor, reasserted order in France, and conquered much of Europe.  
But before that, Modernism had ushered in an enlightened revolution, the American one, 
which established democracy, albeit in a limited way. The Constitution enfranchised the 
population broadly: initially only white and, in some places, property-owning males, before 
broadening after a barbarous Civil War threatened the country and Constitution. One 
political structure – the Electoral College – sought to block a rabble from electing populist 
demagogues as President. (Yes, I appreciate the irony.) By creating three co-equal branches 
of government it also constrained any President from being able to rule as if by divine right.  
Reading Foucault’s lecture in 2011, I reflected on the big news story of that time: The 
News of the World, a venerable British newspaper owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp., 
and directed by his son James, had spent much effort and money hacking into the mobile 
phone messages of celebrities.  
The celebrities’ vociferous protests did little to halt the practice, but then the paper 
hacked the mobile phone of a child who had vanished and was feared dead. The journalists 
deleted the accumulating voicemails from her worried parents and friends, making room for 
more, but only after harvesting their content, names and phone numbers. In so doing, the 
journalists had – unwittingly or not, we can’t be sure – led the family and police to conclude 
the girl was still alive and, well, a runaway, not a victim.  
In the wake of a popular outcry, the Murdochs closed down the newspaper. A 
subsequent judicial inquiry laid out new and still disputed governance arrangements for the 
press (Petley, 2012).  The controversy also saw the Murdochs appear before a British 
parliamentary committee, on what the elder Murdoch declared, ungrammatically, the “most 
humble day of my life” (Guardian, 2011).  
Reflecting on their televised encounter, I came to see Rupert Murdoch as something of a 
Foucault-like version of Machiavelli’s prince. He seemed wilful, self-absorbed and self-
justifying, but at risk of forfeiting his “divine right” through clumsy slaughter of the source 
of his legitimacy: Journalism, while whimsical and often imperious and undemocratic, 
nonetheless performs a social good. Was this, then, a metaphor for CEOs in general? Isn’t 
corporate governance, after all, the attempt to pull corporations out of the pre-modern ways 
of working, into the modern?  
Fast forward to the White House on January 23, 2017. The collection of CEOs in 
Washington that day included the chiefs of Ford, Dell Computer, Fiat-Chrysler and a 
roomful of others, summoned there by CEO-cum-President Trump. In a Foucauldian view, 
the assembled CEOs seemed like little princes, each sovereign in his own principality but 
obeisant. Their wills would be obeyed in their own territories, but they would obey, be 
subservient to, his will: America First.  
The end of the Thirty Years’ War marked beginning of what historians call the Modern 
Era. Modernism asserted a belief in rationality, a belief that truth could be found in science, 
not just religion, and, in Foucault’s notion of governmentality, a belief that the state, in 
whatever form it took, was there to serve the people, not the people to serve powerful but 
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non-state rulers. The world of wilful princes and absolute monarchs had disappeared, and 
Modernism flourished in statecraft, if not in corporate boardrooms.  
Foucault was keenly aware of the limitations of Modernism. Its very rationalism had 
served as a tool to rationalise the slaughter of Jews under the Nazis, not to mention the 
eugenics practiced by Nazi sympathisers, and persecutions of minorities everywhere, 
including homosexuals, and the suppression of women.  
The world Foucault depicted was one of painful complexity and interdependence, one in 
which chains of command were technologies of discipline and freedom perhaps 
unachievable in any tangible sense. But let us recall that, in the view of historian Garry 
Wills, the intentions of Thomas Jefferson in drafting the Declaration of Independence were 
an assertion not so much of individual liberty, but rather of complexity and interdependence 
(Wills, 1978).  
Is Trump, in some sense, a post-modern President? This argument suggests he is not. It 
points instead to a reversion to pre-modern times. He has acted, at least, like the CEO of pre-
modern corporate governance days, before the modernizing of the Cadbury Code (1992) in 
the UK sought to constrain “unfettered power” of CEOs. Its provisions to do so – by creating 
checks and balances in the boardroom along the lines of the US Constitution – were also 
recommended in US listing rules after Enron, WorldCom and many others failed  (Nasdaq, 
2002; NYSE, 2003). 
The most successful CEOs are often imperious, of course. A case in point is Rupert 
Murdoch and his success in building a small Australian newspaper into the empire of global 
news, entertainment, book publishing, film and television we now know as News Corp. and 
21st Century Fox. His case shows that the lack of external constraint, coupled with ambition, 
ideas and personal self-control can lead to superior outcomes.  
But the evidence is mixed (Boyd, 1995; Dalton & Dalton, 2011). Think of Jeffrey 
Skilling’s Enron, or Bernie Ebbers’ WorldCom. These counter-examples recall that 
Machiavelli’s Prince was not so much an essay in praise of the Pre-modern as an 
anticipation of pragmatism and contingency.  
And public governance is different from corporate governance. Consider this: Markets 
in products and service, and particularly in capital, constrain the imperious CEO even when 
board structure and codes cannot. Shareholders can always sell and walk away. But there is 
only a very narrow market for nationalities and homelands. And in the US that market has 
just got smaller, by order of the chief executive.  
Trump’s executive orders, on border control and other matters, suggest a wilful, self-
absorbed and self-justifying mentality of governance that echoes the world of princes and 
divine right of kings that the Thirty Years’ War destroyed. And Wills (2017), drawing on 
Trump’s obsessive hair styling and tweeting, sees something imperial in this President, and 
not in a flattering sense.  
The protest marches that followed Trump’s inauguration and executive orders, in 
Washington and many other cities across the country and around the world, suggest large 
parts of the population are not willing to return to a notion of governance that accepts any 
divine right at its core, let alone the Machiavellian actions of princes, even if those actions 
could “make America great again”.  
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Large parts of American society – Trump’s supporters and those doubtful but loyal 
Republicans who say he is our only President, for now – think differently, however. And 
they may be content, for now. But popular dissatisfaction with both the rationalism of 
Modernism and the complexity of Post-modernism isn’t strong enough to usher in a 
reversion to pre-modern governance. Trump’s election may be a big moment in history. Just 
not that big. We can hope so, at least.  
And this: After the frantic first few weeks of his Presidency, who would accuse the 
Trump & Co. White House of being a democracy? 
 
---------------------------- 
First and second drafts of history 
The essay above emerged from my sense of urgency to say something about contemporary 
events. The paper doesn’t fit easily into any category – too topical to be academic, too 
intellectualized to be journalism, too lacking in conviction to count as political commentary 
in today’s shrill debate. It uses historical analysis in a contemporary context, filtered through 
contemporary history still relevant through the close associate of the actors in 2011 with the 
occupant of the White House in 2017 (Picard & Garrahan, 2017). This essay is neither 
journalism nor history nor social science, at least in a conventional sense. It is a piece of 
writing that seems to have no home, and yet is something I felt impelled to put onto at least 
the digitized form of paper – a citizen’s howl about democracy.  
It was a reaction to news and a (first, preliminary, half-digested) account of something 
nonetheless salient (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Democracy, whatever that means in 
detail, gives the citizen – me – legitimacy to raise matters of concern, a claim warranted by 
the freedom of speech granted in the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Its power is 
difficult to determine in an era of instant (“fake”?) news and the unending stream of words in 
social media, on television, not to mention in academia. But power can be intensified by 
using such platforms to amplify the message.  
As the verbal decibel count rises, it conveys urgency as well, but the urgency itself stems 
from the sense that something is going very wrong. We had better do whatever we citizens, 
outside the corridors of power, can do to keep our social and political systems from running 
off track. This is the salience of citizen journalism, even when this citizen was himself once 
an old-style, traditional journalist.  
Journalism is often called the "first draft of history", however rough that draft might be 
(Edy, 1999).1  In the old days – a time traditional journalists like to recall but with little of 
the documentation that real historians demand – news reporters sought the truth.  
Their – our – mental maps were probably only crude approximations of the intellectual 
terrain they – we – encountered. Perhaps the batteries in their – our – search beacons were 
flat from having consumed too much “juice” the night before. Tales from the trenches may 
go down well in conversations around the bar after the newspaper had gone to bed or the 
newscast was finished. But as some of them – us – set off to academia to look more seriously 
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into researching social phenomena, many found their – our – limited methodologies 
wanting.  
Social science might be termed the second draft of history, still rough around the edges 
but with digestion at least underway. But social science is slow, made slower still by arcane 
processes of peer review, designed to verify the results of empirical tests of positivist 
assertions, if not always so well vitality in argumentation. Meanwhile the escalation of 
conflict between journal publishers over which wins the highest “impact factor” has 
intensified, as even relatively low-ranked journals show off their firepower by length of their 
editorial boards and bragging about their rejection rates. 
And yet, social science research faces a counter pressure for speed, for making the 
second draft of history available as soon as possible after the first. Journals set time limits for 
reviewers to issue their judgments – their rejections, their revise-and-resubmits, their reject-
and-resubmits. As a result ideas often bounce through three journals and several years of 
consideration before finding their way, belatedly, into what we used to know as “print”. 
There they rest, destined rarely to be read even when they have been cited.  
These and related dysfunctions in the processes of academic publishing have been well 
discussed in the editorializing of journal editors (e.g. Bedeian, 2003, 2004; Byron & 
Thatcher, 2016; Cloutier, 2016; Davis, 2014, 2015; Hillman, 2011). The thoughts the Trump 
essay provoked about it concern what response an academic should make to this state of 
affairs in trying to public the second draft of history, when the affairs of state seem so 
pressing.  
One avenue that seems to be opening arises from the editors of those journals who worry 
that “impact factors” are an oxymoron. Many scholars care about the disconnect between 
management research and management (Antonacopoulou, 2009; Learmonth, Lockett, & 
Dowd, 2012; Mirvis, 2014; Thorpe, Eden, Bessant, & Ellwood, 2011). In response, journal 
editors are changing their practices.  
For example, the Journal of Management Inquiry has an occasional feature called 
“Provocations and Provocateurs”, Human Resources Management Journal publishes 
“Provocations”, while Strategic Organization has its “SO!apbox”. Writers have to earn their 
way, through a history of scholarly achievement, to be granted the license to practice the 
freedom to think out load in such spaces.  
For those less established, and so perhaps with less of an establishment orientation, other 
vehicles have emerged. Social Science Research Network, founded by Michael Jensen of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) fame, gave scholars a platform, if not quite a soapbox, to 
experiment with less well-developed ideas. With the corporate governance scandals of the 
early years of the new century, SSRN quickly became the place where scholars might even 
influence public policy formation before the sloth-like world of academic publishing cranked 
itself into (slow) motion. Purchased by Elsevier/Science Direct in 2016, the SSRN 
experiment could either become mainstream or be sapped of its energy and charm. Berkeley 
Electronic Press offers another such forum. And there are more.  
The second draft of history, of at least part of it, is therefore getting faster, dragging 
traditional academic publishing with it, but with what consequences for academic debate? 
Download statistics seem to be creeping into use as a metric for academic success, alongside 
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journal league tables and impact factors. Yet promotion and tenure (where still available) 
seem not to depend much on promoting oneself through these less conventional means.  
Through technology, an apparatus of power in Foucault’s view of history, the “first 
draft” is now, increasingly, unfiltered at input and filtered by “likes” and “shares” upon 
receipt. It broadens its data while narrowing the data available for personal analysis to those 
that suit the assumptions of those seeking to analyze it. Through its own dysfunction, the 
“second draft” is bifurcating into a slow channel seemingly intent on irrelevance and a 
somewhat faster one that has not yet learned that for its salience it needs power and urgency 
as well as legitimacy.  
The essay on Trump, Foucault and Pre-Modern Governance is a small effort to nudge 
contemporary political debate onto another line of inquiry. As a homeless essay, however, its 
lack of power will sap whatever energy might come from its urgency and legitimacy. If you 
found anything in it stimulating, think: Where could it find a home?  
In its form – and the many other demarches penned in response to the Trump Presidency 
– it harks back to the days of the essay, to what in the 18th century and the founding of the 
American republic were a combined first-and-second draft of history. That was before the 
Enlightenment project took a narrow, empiricist turn and Modernism put on its miserablist 
20th century cloak (Toulmin, 1992).  
This essay was as its foundation, then, a plea for urgency and argumentation making 
reference to, and drawing from, the lessons of thoughtful scholarship and scholarly thinking. 
But it leaves open the question of where such essays can find a source of power and how 
they can find an audience.   
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1
 The origin of the phrase is somewhat unclear (Shafer, 2010). The expression gained currency, 
however, through Philip Graham, publisher of the Washington Post, in many statements, including an 
article in Public Administration Review (Graham, 1953). 
